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ABSTRACT: Castoriadis’ logic-ontology of Magmas provides the philosophical presupposition for 
a real democracy anchored on the radical freedom of the imaginary, which breeds an ontological 
novelty, manifested primarily in the psyche and the social-historical. As such, Castoriadis’ radical 
freedom of the imaginary bears some groundbreaking philosophical, epistemological and 
political consequences. Firstly, it breaks with the “determinacy principle” penetrating most part 
of traditional philosophy and modern science. Secondly, it introduces an alternative 
epistemological approach by rendering the living being a for itself developing in terms of constant 
creation and destruction. Thirdly, and most importantly, it creates per se a novel political 
paradigm, crystallized in the project of individual and collective autonomy, which opposes 
equally, yet differently, both Marxism and liberalism, for it consists in the radicalization of 
democracy through the establishment of social freedom, that is, the equal opportunity for 
people’s participation in politics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How does a novel ontological form emerge? What is the “novel”? What is the 
relation of the imaginary to “the novel”? What is the impact of the emergence of 
“the novel” on philosophy, epistemology and politics? I attempt here to sketch 
out some answers to these questions based on the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, 
a contemporaneous Greek-French philosopher, best known to the general public 
for his political philosophy, initially presented in the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie 
from 1949 till 1965 and evolved thereafter in his later writings. His project of 
individual and collective autonomy, following his critique of capitalism and 
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Marxism, is the most prominent reference point of his work. But it is often 
neglected in the literature the relation of his political project to a particular 
ontology Castoriadis was working on, after moving to Paris in 1944 to obtain a 
Ph. D. in philosophy1. Castoriadis did not complete his Ph. D. thesis, for he 
devoted himself to political thinking, the latter crystallized in the articles he wrote 
in the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie, of which he was the co-founder along with 
Claude Lefort. It remained almost completely unknown, till the recent 
publication of some of his early manuscripts2, that, alongside his writings in 
Socialisme ou Barbarie, Castoriadis was elaborating a logic-ontology that would be 
more clearly formulated in his later writings, that would bring about a break with 
Hegelo-Marxism and traditional philosophy. 
In this article, I focus on the concept of the imaginary in the thought of 
Castoriadis by examining how a novel ontological form emerges. To activate the 
political project of Castoriadis in the creation of new paradigms of 
institutionalizing and present new solutions to the pressing social and ecological 
issues of our times, we need to come to grips with Castoriadis’s ontology; to 
understand in depth how the novel is conceived; in which fashion it emerges in 
nature, the psyche and the social-historical world respectively; how nature, the 
psyche and the social-historical interact in the emergence of the novel; which are 
its ontological-philosophical, scientific and political implications. 
The paper begins by demonstrating the main features of Castoriadis’s logic-
ontology of Magmas, that is, the indeterminacy of ontological creation. It then 
goes on to show that, in Castoriadis, the locus par excellence of ontological 
creation is the radical imaginary of the human psyche and the social imaginary 
of the anonymous collective. It makes the case that Castoriadis’s 
conceptualization of the imaginary generates some major philosophical, 
epistemological, and political breakthroughs that shake up the foundations of 
modern philosophy, epistemology and political theory. To some extent, 
Castoriadis’s ontology reflects the contemporaneous breakthroughs in physics, 
psychoanalysis and biology. From a strictly political standpoint, Castoriadis’s 
 
1 Nicolas Poirier,“La pensée philosophique de Castoriadis á l’ époque de Socialisme ou Barbarie” in 
Cornelius Castoriadis. Réinventer l’ autonomie, sous la direction de Blaise Bachofen, Sion Elbaz et Nicolas 
Poirier, Éditions du Sandre, Paris, 2008, pp. 59-72; Nicolas Poirier, L’ ontologie politique de Castoriadis, 
Création et Institution, Édition Payot & Rivages, Paris, 2011, pp. 21-33. 
2 Cornelius Castoriadis, Histoire et Création, textes philosophiques inédits (1945-1967), Édition du Seuil, Paris, 2009. 
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conceptualization of the imaginary introduces a radical notion of freedom that 
sustains philosophically his project of individual and collective autonomy, striving 
towards a democratic and ecological reorientation of society. My core argument 
is that, in Castoriadis, direct democracy is the expression of a social freedom, 
deriving from the “evolution” of the “elementary” imaginary of the living being 
into the radical imaginary of the psyche and the social imaginary of the 
anonymous collective. Social freedom stems from the autonomization/rupture of 
the social-historical from nature. Contrary to potential naturalistic 
misinterpretations of Castoriadis’s concept of freedom, my main aim here is not 
to ascribe the concept of autonomy in the natural world or physis, but to stress 
the social dimension of freedom, anchored philosophically on Castoriadis’s logic-
ontology of Magmas, which holds the ontological preconditions for a 
postfoundational theory of direct democracy. 
Indeterminacy and Creation 
Castoriadis’s ontology consists in the Logic of Magmas, the basic properties of 
which are indeterminacy and creation. Whereas it is no place here to analyze in 
toto Castoriadis’s Logic of Magmas, suffices to mention that Being is a magma or, 
in other words, Chaos or Abyss marked by indeterminacy and creation, thus 
echoing the notions of infinity and Chaos in Anaximander and Hesiod 
respectively3. In the framework of Castoriadis’s ontology, Being is Chaos or Abyss, 
unfolding in a multiplicity of two modes: difference and otherness4. Difference 
follows what Castoriadis calls as “the ensemblistic-identitary Logic” or, for 
brevity, the ensidic Logic, originating in Aristotle’s Typical Logic and further 
elaborated by contemporaneous Mathematics set theory. Georg Cantor, the 
 
3 According to Castoriadis’s reading of Anaximander, the notion of infinity does not merely signifies the 
endless (the atermon), which was attributed by Aristotle to Anaximander and has prevailed in Mathematics 
ever since. In Anaximander, the notion of infinity refers to the indeterminate in quality and quantity or, in 
other words, the empirically non-representable. As for Castoriadis’s reading of Hesiod’s notion of Chaos, 
chaos signifies the void of the world, an open space with indeterminate limits, and the amorphous mixture, 
whereby novel ontological forms emerge. In short, for Castoriadis, Anaximander’s notion of infinity tangles 
with Hesiod’s notion of Chaos, as long as they both conceptualize the indeterminacy of Being’ s self-
creation. See Cornelius Castoriadis, Ce qui fait la Grèce, 1. D’ Homère à Héraclite, Seminaires 1982-1983, Éditions 
du Seuil, Paris,  mars 2004, pp. 163-201.    
4 Cornelius Castoriadis, World in Fragments. Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination. Ed. 
and trans. David Ames Curtis. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
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founder of set theory, defines a set as a collection of distinct elements of our 
observation or thought into an organic whole, the interrelations of which can be 
fully determined according to the laws of Mathematics5. For Castoriadis, the 
concept of difference applies to the deduction or abduction of a novel ontological 
form from a predetermined set of elements on the model of Mathematics set 
theory. Difference refers to the recomposition of already existent set of elements. 
Otherness, instead, points to the creation of new forms of Being, surpassing 
predetermined sets of elements. Otherness is an attribute of time per se. 
Time is being insofar as being is otherness, creation and destruction (…) Time is 
creation and destruction – that means, time is being in its substantive 
determinations.6  
It is no place here to go through Castoriadis's notion of time in full detail7. 
Suffice to note that, for Castoriadis, Being is temporal and time is otherness in 
terms of the creation and destruction of ontological lifeforms. The creation of a 
novel form presupposes the destruction of a previous form and the alteration of 
the latter by/into the former8. The novel emerges on the grounds of the old, but 
the old enters the novel in terms of the novel9. The novel is not a hybrid of the 
old, but an otherness carrying the old within itself. In this sense, otherness is 
irreducible, indeducible, and non-reproducible10. Otherness is a creation ex nihilo, 
that is, neither cum nihilo nor in nihilo. But what does ex nihilo mean? 
Being is creation, vis formandi: not creation of “matter-energy”, but creation of forms. 
Of that creation, there exist each time necessary but not sufficient conditions. 
Creation as to the form, the eidos, is ex nihilo; but it is neither in nihilo nor cum nihilo 11. 
 
Castoriadis does not purport to violate the second law of thermodynamics 
 
5 Georg Cantor, ‘Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre (1)’, Mathematische Annalen, 46 (4), 
1895: pp.481-512. 
6 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, p. 395, p. 399. 
7 For a more detailed analysis of the concept of time in Castoriadis’s, including its relation to the concept of 
time in contemporary physics and its convergencies and divergencies from the concept of time in Bergson, 
see: Vangelis Papadimitropoulos, ‘Indeterminacy and Creation in the Work of Cornelius Castoriadis’, 
Cosmos and History: the Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 1, 2015, pp. 256-268. 
8 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, pp. 396-401. 
9 Cornelius Castoriadis, A Society Adrift, Interviews and Debates: 1974-1997, Fordham University Press, New 
York, 2010, p. 54. 
10 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, p. 395. 
11 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, pp. 250-254 
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according to which matter-energy remains constant over time. He states that 
Being is not a creation in nihilo or cum nihilo, but from within and by a preexisting 
form of Being. Nothingness is neither the substratum of Being nor a negativity 
deployed in terms of a reversed positivity, as introduced by Hegel. Nothingness 
lies in the indeterminacy of the creation of a new form inasmuch as the latter is 
subjected to necessary but not sufficient conditions. The novel is tied to necessary 
conditions ‒ it is not created whatsoever. Yet, it transcends necessity by 
transforming into originality. For Castoriadis, there is no strict sense of causality. 
The latter stems from what Castoriadis calls as “the determinacy principle”, that 
is, a central tendency of inherited thought to ascribe to Being an essence, be it 
either God’s mathematical forms in Plato’s Timaeus; or God’s rationality in 
Aristotle’s naturalistic account of Being; or Kant’s transcendental subject; or 
Hegel’s Absolute Spirit; or Marx’s historical materialism. “The determinacy 
principle” implies that we could deduct or abduct from a universal substance or 
driving force the entire multiplicity of Being’s types and elements and, thus, 
discover its organic structure by applying its Logic of identity-unity, which can 
provide for a scientific reasoning premised on necessary and sufficient conditions. 
It is the same reasoning that originates in Aristotle’s Typical Logic, evolving into 
the scientific logic of modern positivism. In this sense, Being is the natural 
unfolding of its a priori Logic. Being is deterministic and, in a sense, tautological.   
Castoriadis holds, instead, that strict causality applies to Being’s mode of 
difference immanent in all sorts of sets of elements determined according to 
Mathematics sets theory. Alternatively, the mode of otherness corresponds to the 
indeterminacy of creation, for which there are no sufficient, but only necessary 
conditions, inasmuch as otherness emerges as a creation ex nihilo, that is, a 
creation that cannot be reduced to a mechanistic causality12. We cannot provide, 
for example, a comprehensive account of why, and mostly how, Einstein 
discovered the theory of relativity or Kafka wrote The Castle. We can describe 
some necessary conditions, outline some intrinsic connections between Einstein’s 
theory of relativity and past physics or Kafka’s The Castle and past literature, but 
neither is causally reduced to nor deducted by Newton’s mechanics and past 
literature.  
 
12 Cornelius Castoriadis, Fait et à faire, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1997, pp. 21-22. 
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For Castoriadis, Being does not consist in the laws of Mathematics set theory, 
but in the logic-ontology of Magmas. At a first glance, the very term “logic-
ontology of Magmas” is contradictory inasmuch as it indicates the ensidic 
dimension of Being. But the ensidic is only one dimension of Being. The other 
dimension belongs to the ontology of Magmas.    
A magma is that from which one can extract (or in which one can construct) an 
indefinite number of ensemblist organizations, but which can never be 
reconstituted (ideally) by a (finite or infinite) ensemblist composition of these 
organizations.13 
The logic-ontology of Magmas does not consist in a composition of ensemblist 
organizations but in a web/network dense with multivocality, wherein each 
ontological category is co-determined by the set of elements it applies to14. A 
magma is a qualitatively different mode of Being that transcends ensemblist 
organisation. Castoriadis attempted to construe an explicit Logic of Magmas, but, 
as he himself admits, he did not succeed in doing so15. He stressed, however, the 
need to create a novel Logic in the ontological form of Magmas. 
We think that we can, that a new logic can, should, and will be elaborated. For in 
the end there can be no escaping the need to forge a language and ‘concepts’ 
adequate to deal with such objects of study as ‘elementary’ particles, the cosmic 
field, the self-organisation of the living being, the unconscious of the social 
historical. This new logic will be able to take account of what, in itself, is neither a 
disorganized chaos giving rise to ‘impressions’ out of which consciousness can freely 
tailor ‘facts’, nor a system (or a well-articulated sequence, whether finite or infinite, 
of systems) of neatly divided ‘things’ in an orderly alignment with each other; yet 
which nonetheless also remains ‘in part’ capable of being grasped in a certain 
manner – and in a manner, moreover, which continues to present a ‘partial’ 
testimony to the relative freedom of consciousness vis-à-vis the given. This new 
logic will not supersede set-theoretical logic, nor simply adjoin itself to it. By virtue 
of the very nature of our language, the only relationship it could entertain with set-
theoretical logic would be circular, since it would itself, for example, have to employ 
‘distinct’ and ‘defined’ terms in order to be able to say that what there is, or can be 
thought or said, is not in its ultimate essence organized in accordance with the 
modes of the distinct and the defined.16 
 
13 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, Polity Press, UK, USA, 1987, p. 343. 
14 Cornelius Castoriadis, Crossroads in the Labyrinth, The Harvester Press, London, 1984, p. 218. 
15 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Castoriadis Reader, Blackwell Publishers, UK, USA, 1997, pp. 290-318. 
16 Cornelius Castoriadis, Crossroads in the Labyrinth, The Harvester Press, London, 1984, pp. 216-217. 
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The circular relation of an incomplete or yet to be completed logic-ontology 
of Magmas to the set-theoretical logic escapes the tautological cycle of ontological 
creation inasmuch as otherness resides in the indeterminate spiraling of cosmos 
and the imaginary. 
The Radical and Social Imaginary 
In Castoriadis’s ontology, Being is divided into three entangled but separated 
strata: the physis, the psyche, and the social-historical17. Physis is the first stratum 
of Being, split into the non-living being (inorganic nature) and the living being 
(organic nature). The non-living being consists solely in the ensemblistic-
identitary dimension or, for brevity, the ensidic Logic, according to which nature 
can be divided into sets of distinct elements analyzed in terms of Mathematics set 
theory. The living being, instead, features three additional properties: 
intentionality (l’ intention), affect (l’ affect) and representation (la représentation).   
Intentionality resembles Aristotle’s notion of automaton and what continental 
philosophy refers to as the “for itself ” (pour soi). It points to an elementary finality 
aiming at the self-preservation of the species through self-reproduction. Finality 
is accompanied by the feeling of pleasure (plaisir) and displeasure (deplaisir). Yet, 
however similar seems at first Castoriadis’s notions of intentionality and affect 
with Aristotle’s notions of automaton and orekton, Castoriadis’s conceptualization 
differs radically from Aristotle’s thinking. In Castoriadis, there is no God 
assuming the role of the first unmoved mover (proton kinoun akineton), driving 
nature’s automaton and orekton. Castoriadis’s notion of the living being echoes 
Aristotle’s dynamic interpretation of organic nature, but it simultaneously 
dissociates from a Typical Logic that evolves into the mechanistic worldview of 
the Classical age, firstly introduced by Descartes and developed later on by 
Newton and Laplace, eventually culminating in the scientific determinism of 
modernity. Castoriadis does not consider the living being a mechanistic 
automaton, the self-reproduction of which is explained in terms of causes and 
effects. 
In contrast to ensidic Logic, Castoriadis conceives of the living being as a “for 
itself ” evolving according to the temporal otherness of biological autonomy. 
 
17 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, Polity Press, UK, USA, 1987, pp. 229-336. 
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Castoriadis draws from Fransesco Varela’s notion of biological autonomy to 
describe the way representation functions in the living being. In 1979, Varela, in 
co-operation with his teacher Humberto Maturana, introduced the notion of 
biological autonomy, which differentiates from the notion of Aristotelian 
teleonomy18. Biological autonomy refers to the capacity of nature’s flora and fauna 
to filter out inorganic matter via its sensory organs cognitive-information closure. 
That is to say, each biological species, be it a plant or animal, performs a unique 
sensory interaction with inorganic matter. It is due to this uniqueness that nature’s 
vast biodiversity unfolds before us. Each living being discerns between “noise” 
and a useful for itself inorganic matter, transformed into organic information for 
the purposes of self-preservation and self-reproduction. 
Castoriadis observes that the unique sensory filtering of nature’s ensemblistic-
identitary dimension by each living being, explicated by Varela and Maturana in 
terms of a biological autonomy, constitutes per se an heterogeneous ontological 
creation, an alteration that develops “for itself ” into a sensorial and logical closure, 
thereby sustaining the unique “subjectivity” of each living being. “Obviously, in 
all this we are not presupposing, in the living being, any "subjectivity" of the kind 
familiar to us. We are presupposing, however, the evident fact that each living 
being (each living species, at least—an olive, a tree, a starfish, a cicada) forms and 
informs, organizes the world, after its own fashion (. . .) The living being creates 
new forms, and, first of all, creates itself qua form or rather super-form that 
integrates and deploys itself in an innumerable multiplicity of categorial forms 
specific to the living being (nutrition, metabolism, homeostasis, reproduction, 
sexuation, etc.), while at the same time it multiplies itself by differentiating itself 
into different species”19. 
Hence, for Castoriadis, representation does not consist neither in a 
photograph of nature nor in a passive processing of external data in terms of an 
input-output pattern, as interpreted by behaviorism and a vast part of cognitive 
science, including information theory and artificial intelligence. The living being 
is not a calculative “machine” processing stable external stimuli. To be accurate, 
there are no stable external stimuli in nature, namely, no colors, sounds, and 
 
18 Francesco Varela, Principles of Biological Autonomy, North Holland, New York and Oxford, 1979. 
19 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, pp. 349-351. 
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smells, but radiant energy and electromagnetic waves, filtered as colors, sounds 
and smells by each living being’s specific sense. “Thus, for us humans as simple 
living beings, polarized light does not exist (whereas it is of utmost importance 
for the bees or the sea turtles), as well as radio waves do not exist for none earth 
living being”20.   
Jeff Klooger rightly points out that, for Castoriadis, the living being is not 
reduced to the gene as to its specific traits or predispositions, but as to the 
reproduction of the species per se. As species, the living being is encoded in the 
gene and reproduced as such. The cow will give birth to a calf in accordance with 
the genetic make-up of the given species. The predispositions and traits of the 
living being are reduced to the DNA in terms of necessary but not sufficient 
conditions. The genetic make-up of the living being echoes Aristotle’s notion of 
potentiality, which depends on the actual conditions of the environment, 
including the psyche and the social-historical. Biology relates to nature in a way 
that does not contravene nature’s laws. Yet, biology is not reduced to physics. 
“The physical universe and its laws may be regarded as the necessary condition 
for the emergence of the living being, but they are not their sufficient condition; 
they determine neither that life shall emerge nor what shall emerge as life”21. The 
living being’s actual development is an indeterminate function of genetic 
predispositions and specific environmental conditions (inorganic nature).  
For Castoriadis, one of the most crucial drivers of the living being’s self-
development is the intentionality of affect, represented by “the elementary 
imaginary”. The living being encapsulates Varela and Maturana’s notion of 
biological autonomy by evolving into a “for itself ” that filters the ensidic dimension 
of nature via its unique sensory filter. The “subjective” filtering of nature via the 
representation of the living being stems from what Castoriadis has coined “the 
elementary imaginary” (une imagination élémentaire), which is the initial form of the 
radical imaginary, corresponding to the body or, otherwise, to the living being’s 
“animal psyche”22. The elementary imaginary mirrors the representational 
transformation of nature’s ensidic dimension into the living being’s diversified 
 
20 Cornelius Castoriadis, Human Domains, Ipsilon, Athens, 1995, p. 350 (In Greek). 
21 Jeff Klooger, Castoriadis: Psyche, Society, Autonomy, Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2009, p. 
94. 
22 Castoriadis, Fait et à faire, pp. 294-336. 
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sensorial and logical closure (clôture). To put it crudely, for Castoriadis, nature 
bears in itself a sort of primordial imagination, evolving from the elementary 
imaginary of the living being into the radical imaginary of the psyche and the 
social imaginary of the anonymous collective.  
We can, therefore, trace the “origin” of ontological novelty in the first stratum 
of the imaginary, that is, the elementary imaginary of the living being, unfolding 
in the form of a representation fueled by affect and intentionality. I use the term 
“origin” here not in a linear fashion, but in terms of rupture and mutation. The 
elementary imaginary transforms into the second stratum of the imaginary, that 
is, the radical imaginary of the human psyche that emerges out of the biological 
over-development of the central nervous system, the latter accompanying the 
autonomization of the feeling of pleasure. The autonomization of pleasure reflects 
the domination of representational pleasure over sexual pleasure, following the 
biological-organic defunctionalization of pleasure, thereby resulting in the 
autonomy of the radical imaginary from the biological functionality of the living 
being’s organic self-preservation and self-reproduction. Thus, the autonomy of 
the feeling of pleasure develops in the free intentional / affective / 
representational flux of the human psyche. 
We can now relocate the conception of the novel in the radical imaginary or, 
in other words, in the free intentional / affective / representational flux of the 
human psyche, which, as such, is not reduced to the causality of the ensidic 
dimension of nature. Whereas autonomy for the living being concerns 
“functionality”, autonomy for the human psyche is totally dysfunctional. The 
radical imaginary consists in the capacity of human psyche to disengage from the 
purely organic functions of the body that serve exclusively the self-preservation 
of the living being. Whereas the capacity of the elementary imaginary to see an 
image (perception) is found in every living being, the radical imaginary expands 
this capacity by positing that which is not there. The radical imaginary is not 
merely a mirror of nature, but a creation ex nihilo of novel imaginary 
significations. Whereas the elementary imaginary of the living being is enslaved 
into functionality, the radical imaginary of the human psyche breaks with the 
ensidic dimension of nature through the autonomization of imagination.  
When entering the realm of the human psyche, intentionality transforms into 
desire. The radical imaginary of the human psyche lays the ground for the 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 34 
interplay between the subconscious and the conscious. For Castoriadis, though, 
the interplay of the subconscious and the conscious surpasses the Freudian 
conflict between purely sexual pleasure and societal repression, for it takes the 
form of a representational pleasure that dominates sexual pleasure, thereby 
transposing itself into the social imaginary of the anonymous collective, the latter 
reflecting the magma of the imaginary significations of the social-historical. For 
Castoriadis, the real conflict is not the one between sexual pleasure and the 
relevant repression of society, but the one between the monadic core of the psyche 
and society, that is, between the primitive urges of the psyche and the instituted23.  
The conception of the novel emerges now anew on the basis of the 
sublimation of the primitive urges of the human psyche into society via the 
instituted imaginary significations of the anonymous collective. The radical 
imaginary of the human psyche transforms into the social imaginary of the 
anonymous collective via the creation of an inter-general representation, a 
common or social representation that crystallizes the magma of the imaginary 
significations of the social-historical into the meaning of language24. For 
Castoriadis, there can be no thought without or outside language. It is for this 
reason that the word “Jesus” echoes the same to all adherents of Christianism, 
and the word “cow” holds the same religious meaning for all adherents of 
Hinduism. In this sense, the creation of the novel surpasses the sublimation of the 
psyche into society, inasmuch as it transcends the boundaries of the conflict 
between the psyche and society, re-establishing anew the self-institutionalization 
of society on the basis of the constant friction between the instituting power of 
the radical imaginary and the instituted power of the social imaginary. Therefore, 
the “final” locus of the novel is the social-historical, wherein the radical imaginary 
constantly interacts with the social imaginary, since the sublimation of the psyche 
into society is a never-ending two-way process.   
The Social-Historical 
Castoriadis’s conception of the imaginary has a number of critical philosophical, 
epistemological and sociopolitical implications. Firstly, the ontological 
 
23 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, pp. 294-316. 
24 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 246. 
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indeterminacy that sustains the creation of the novel breaches the “determinacy 
principle” of traditional philosophy. In Castoriadis’ ontology, there is no universal 
substance, no essence, no driving force, no origin nor foundation of Being. The 
only existent “principle” is the indeterminacy of creation, being itself an 
immanent cause and effect: the freedom inherent in the radical imaginary of the 
human psyche; the freedom, thus, hypostatized in the ontological creation of the 
novel, as manifested in the evolution of the social-historical.   
Secondly, the freedom of the social imaginary breaks with the determinism 
of natural science, for it introduces an alternative epistemological conception of 
nature, reflecting the evolution of natural sciences in the 20th century. Nature is 
not perceived by Castoriadis in terms of the ensidic Logic of Mathematics set 
theory, according to which nature is a superset of sets, composed by structural 
elements, the logical relations of which organize the function of the system as a 
whole. The ensidic dimension is immanent in nature. Yet, nature transforms into 
the magma of the imaginary significations of the social-historical. Nature is not a 
synthesis of once and for all given (chemical) elements, composed and 
recomposed on the basis of some eternal biological or probabilistic laws. Nature 
is a permanent ontological self-creation and destruction of forms; a constant 
emergence of new domains and “laws” on the debris of the old ones. Science is 
not an autonomous development of ensidic Logic, but a social recreation of 
nature. Imagination intrudes scientific explanation in the form of a signification 
that transforms the ensidic dimension of nature. Castoriadis thus introduces a 
social-historical perspectivism, intending further to democratize technoscience 
according to the magma of the imaginary significations of the anonymous 
collective.  
 Suzy Adams is right to argue that Castoriadis’s conception of nature 
radicalizes Aristotle’s notion of physis in two ways: it transcends the qualitative 
movement and change (alloiosis) of physis into the creative emergence of otherness, 
while, at the same time, it disengages from a teleological conception according to 
which physis tends to an end predetermined by God, that is, the “first unmoved 
mover” driving the qualitative movement and change (alloiosis) of physis propelled 
by the eros of the form25. Adams makes clear that the primary locus of otherness 
 
25 Suzy Adams, ‘Castoriadis’ Shift towards Physis’ , Thesis Eleven, Number 74, August 2003, pp. 105-112. 
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is not nature itself but the human psyche and society. Nature, as the first stratum 
of Being, only partakes in the ontological conditions of indeterminacy and 
creation, evidenced first and foremost in the radical imaginary of the human 
psyche. To reiterate, the evolution of the imaginary from the living being into the 
psyche and the social-historical is not linear, but a discontinuous process of 
rupture and mutation; hence the creation ex nihilo that goes beyond any 
deterministic reductionism and causality. Society disengages from nature through 
the autonomization of the social imaginary. It is by this sense that Castoriadis’s 
conception of Being, as a creative emergence of otherness, contrasts the 
mechanistic view of cosmos in the Classical age and the concomitant positivism 
of modernity that perpetuates Aristotle’s teleology. To the degree that nature is 
transformed by the social imaginary, it is irreducible to the determinism of 
positivism. It exits ensidic Logic and enters the logic-ontology of Magmas. The 
social imaginary transcends the metaphysical boundaries of materialism and 
idealism, for it produces an alternative epistemological approach, assimilating the 
scientific discoveries of the 20th century. 
Are we imposing our schemata ‒ or new schemata ‒ on a new layer of reality, or 
have we encountered something indicating that some schemata actually do 
correspond to something beyond our comprehension? It is always both26. 
Not only does science discover, but also recreates nature in the playful 
experimentation between the known and the unknown. Science is a constant 
recreation of the known and the unknown. There are no strict boundaries 
between nature and the human observer. We cannot decide whether what we 
observe comes from the observed or the observer − except of course in trivial 
cases. “So the question of the ultimate origin of our knowledge is undecidable 
forever ‒ that is, the principle of undecidability of the origin”27. The 
undecidability principle presupposes the indeterminacy of creation, which 
sustains the radical freedom of the novel. For there is nothing novel in a 
predetermined context of absolute laws except the eternal repetition of the 
already given, demonstrated either in a purely theological context or in the 
cryptotheological context of a conservative scientific positivism. Thus, the radical 
 
26 Castoriadis, A Society Adrift, p. 59 
27 Castoriadis, A Society Adrift, p. 59. 
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freedom of the imaginary contrasts a basic tendency of positivism in modernity, 
which builds on Descartes’s program of rendering human the master and 
possessor of nature, thereby culminating in what Castoriadis coined “the rational 
mastery” of the unlimited expansion of economy and technology in nature and 
society28. 
The third, thus, and probably most important consequence of the radical 
freedom of the imaginary concerns the paradoxical twist of technoscience from 
the Industrial Revolution onwards into the rational mastery of the unlimited 
expansion of economy and technology into nature and society. The rational 
mastery designates the excess of overdevelopment, depicted in the disastrous 
application of ensidic Logic in nature and society, resulting in the ecological crisis 
of our era. For Castoriadis, what is radically novel from modernity onwards is the 
devastation of a biosphere of 2 billion years by a capitalist system aged 200 years. 
The rational mastery of the unlimited expansion of economy and technology has 
caused an unprecedented abuse of nature and society. 
Despite the indisputable fact that the explosion of the novel in the positive 
sciences has generated countless beneficial effects to everyday life, we are, at the 
same time, facing a multidimensional ecological crisis, raising serious bioethical 
concerns regarding the quality of food, the greenhouse effect, the sustainability 
of the planet, biodiversity, the mapping of the human genome, and so on. As 
Castoriadis emphatically points out, scientists are most often driven by short-
termism, leaving out the long-term effects of their actions on the environment 
and on society. “In other words, given a linear time and an infinite temporal 
horizon, we act as if the only significant interval of time was the very near 
future”29.          
 The commercialization of the “feasible” at any cost is a symptom of a greedy 
neoliberalism causing the economic crisis of 2008. The “bubbles” of the 
American bank elite testify to the global market becoming a planetary casino, 
whereby the unlimited quantification of the ensidic Logic and the subsequent 
commercialization of the “feasible” sustain a social Darwinism creating winners 
 
28 Vangelis Papadimitropoulos, ‘The Rational Mastery in Castoriadis’, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 29 (3), 
2018, pp. 51-67. 
29 Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, edited by David Ames Curtis, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1991, p. 195. 
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and losers in the “natural” selection of the market. The neoliberal 
commercialization of the “feasible” crystallizes the rational mastery of the 
unlimited expansion of economy and technology in nature and society. 
Neoliberal capitalism thus perpetuates the jungle of nature into society by 
cannibalizing both nature and society. 
Castoriadis juxtaposes against neoliberalism a radical notion of political 
freedom premised on the ontological indeterminacy of creation, which 
formulates the philosophical presuppositions for a real democracy embedded in 
his project of individual and collective autonomy. Political freedom translates into 
self-governance through democratic deliberation, aiming at the self-
institutionalization of the laws governing the public and private sphere. Similarly 
to ancient Greek democracy, Castoriadis distinguishes three spheres of society: 
the private sphere (oikos), the private/public sphere (agora) and the public sphere 
(ekklesia). ‘Democracy is the correct articulation of those three spheres, with the 
public sphere becoming really public’30. The seeds of ancient Greek democracy 
found fertile ground in the social movements of the 17th and 18th centuries in West 
Europe. Castoriadis, thus, locates two major moments of autonomy in modernity: 
liberalism and Marxism.  
Yet, his project opposes equally, but differently, both Marxism and liberalism, 
for it consists in a positive freedom re-locating the negative freedom of liberalism 
into the self-government of all domains of society through the radicalization of 
the citizens’ equal right to participate in politics. Castoriadis engages in the 
contemporary discussion over the political and politics31 to elaborate his concept of 
self-institutionalization. In this framework, the institution manifests in two forms: 
the instituting and the instituted 32. The instituted is based on the instituting capacity of 
the social imaginary. It is a creation of the anonymous collective that produces a 
radical ground-power, or primordial power, necessary for the self-preservation 
and self-perpetuation of the human species. Primordial power constitutes an 
explicit power, termed the political, which manifests itself in law, tradition, 
 
30 Castoriadis, A Society Adrift, p. 5. 
31 Oliver Marchart, Post-foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. 
32 Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, edited by David Ames Curtis, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1991, pp.143-174. 
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language, religion, technique, etc. Yet, the instituting transcends the instituted, as it 
refers to the autonomy of the anonymous collective to transform the political. 
Whereas societies have been mostly developed on conditions of instituted 
heteronomy, with the essential constituent of it being the representation of an 
extra-social source of nomos (be it the myth, the tradition, the religion, etc.), 
autonomy refers to politics as the potentiality of constantly questioning the political.      
Castoriadis’s notion of positive freedom surpasses the negative freedom of 
liberalism, for it exceeds the passivity of rights by re-introducing the Aristotelian 
ideal of the citizens to be able to rule and to be ruled. As Konstantinos 
Kavoulakos quite accurately mentions, the three basic values of a real democracy 
are the following: 1) the positive freedom of opinion and action in a “rational” 
level of self-limitation 2) the abolition of every “natural” hierarchy, which implies 
the equality of all citizens regarding their opportunity of participating in the 
formulation of the law of society 3) the potential for the constant revision of 
justice. “Freedom, equality and justice are the fundamental values the societal 
bond is based on in an autonomous or democratic society”33. 
Castoriadis equally opposes Marxism on various grounds. Marx was led to 
narrow down greatly the field of self-institutionalization to the level of production 
and economy, leaving aside the political question, that is, the question of power 
itself, in the assumption that the latter will be resolved spontaneously in the higher 
phase of communism, after the main theorem of revolution will have been 
applied. Marx was equally sedated by the economism of capitalism in placing the 
economy at the center of politics; in adopting, in other words, capitalism’s central 
imaginary, as epitomized in the model of homo oeconomicus34. Finally, the 
theoretical approach of the later Marx took dominance over the revolutionary 
element of the younger Marx. In the so-called socialist states of the former 
Eastern Bloc regimes, Marx’s project was interpreted in a positivist manner to 
such an extent that the revolutionary project of the younger Marx was 
transformed into the political dogma of Leninist-Stalinist Marxism. 
  Castoriadis’s model of direct democracy contrasts the representative and 
procedural model of democracy, adopted by either liberal or social democratic 
 
33 Konstantinos Kavoulakos, ‘Freedom and Democratic Politics in the thought of Cornelius Castoriadis’, 
Psyche, Logos, Polis, Hommage to Cornelius Castoriadis, Ipsilon, Athens, 2007, p. 219 (In Greek). 
34 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society. 
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political theories like those of Rawls and Habermas. Castoriadis has developed 
an extended critique of representative democracy, following Rousseau in the 
argument that the citizens under such a regime are free to participate in politics 
once every five years. As such, representative democracy is the window-dressing 
for a liberal oligarchy infused by the rational mastery of capitalism, as propagated 
by corporate lobbying and the corresponding manipulation of the public opinion, 
aiming at keeping the citizens within the private sphere of consumerism, 
conformism and cynicism. Hence, the public sphere is controlled by the private 
sphere of the economic and political elite that prescribes to a large extent the 
content of both private/public and private sphere. As Castoriadis puts it: 
Paradoxically, today's pseudodemocracies in the West have in fact rendered the 
public sphere in large part private: the decisions that really count are those made 
in secret or behind the scenes (of the Government, the parliamentary system, and 
the party Apparatuses). A definition of democracy as good as any other is: It is the 
regime in which the public sphere becomes truly and effectively public—belongs 
to everyone, is effectively open to the participation of all35. 
For Castoriadis, direct democracy should be the field of the emergence of the 
novel par excellence, for only real democracy could emancipate society from “the 
liberal oligarchies” of our times36. A real democracy permits the highest degree 
of the radical freedom of the novel through an ontological openness, the political 
risk of which reveals the tragicalness of freedom itself. But even if we freely choose 
the Hellenic-West tradition of autonomy, as Agnes Heller claims Castoriadis does, 
why does this free choice not result in the reversed mastery of one freedom over 
another? 37 Besides, it is the same tradition that gave birth to both Englightment 
and fascism. Heller wonders then how direct democracy can be secured against 
turning into a fascist regime. Castoriadis is alert to the excesses of the rational 
mastery, resulting in the devastation of the environment, the monstrosities of 
socialism and nazism, the capitalist economic crises, the repression of minorities 
and so on. Castoriadis does not render the Hellenic-Western tradition superior 
 
35 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Democracy as procedure and as regime’. in The rising tide of insignificancy, translated 
from the French and edited anonymously as a public service, 2003, pp. 340-341. 
36 Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 173. 
37 Agnes Heller, ‘With Castoriadis to Aristotle; from Aristotle to Kant; from Kant to Us’, Autonomie et 
Autotransformation de la societe, la philosophie militante de Cornelius Castoriadis, edited by Giovani Busino, Geneva: 
Librairie Droz, 1989, pp. 168-171.  
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to all others, but he highlights one dimension of this tradition—that is, autonomy 
and democracy—against every totalitarianism that abolishes autonomy and 
democracy38. The only rational criterion of autonomy is the abolition of 
heteronomy per se, meaning the inalienable right of people to choose by and for 
themselves via a regime of direct democracy that can revise and correct its 
mistakes over time.   
Castoriadis was not a politician. He, therefore, abstained from articulating a 
concrete political planning for the realization of his project, since any single 
theoretical planning of direct democracy is a self-contradiction in terms. Direct 
democracy cannot but be plural, practical and collective. Castoriadis rejected the 
current political system in toto, relying solely on the autonomous activity of 
individuals and collectivities. Interestingly, we are witnessing today a number of 
decentralized and self-managed initiatives emerging on the model of platform 
cooperativism and Commons-based peer production, supported by the Internet 
and free/open source software/hardware39. Several projects and case studies 
echo today Castoriadis’s vision of real democracy in several respects. However, 
movements such as platform cooperativism and the Commons face multiple 
barriers: a lack of access to resources and capital, a significant gap in managerial 
and technical skills, sectoral and operational isolation in a number of subsectors, 
and a lack of public policy and institutional support from both the state and larger 
cooperatives. The Commons still depend largely on financial and technological 
systems managed by corporate capital and neoliberal state policies40. In 
Castoriadis’s terms, the Commons are still largely heteronomous rather than 
 
38 Castoriadis, Fait et à faire, p. 63. 
39 David Bollier, and Silke Helfrich, The Wealth of the Commons:  A World Beyond Market and State, Levellers 
Press, 2012; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons:  The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990; Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006; Vasilis Kostakis and Michel Bauwens, Network Society 
and Future Scenarios for a Collaborative Economy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; Vangelis 
Papadimitropoulos, ‘Socialisme ou Barbarie: From Castoriadis’ Project of Individual and Collective 
Autonomy to the Commons’. TripleC 14(1), (2016), pp. 265-278; Vangelis Papadimitropoulos, ‘From 
Socialism to Open Cooperativism: Convergences and Divergences in the work of Castoriadis, Olin Wright 
and Bauwens and Kostakis’, Global Journal of Human-Social Science (F), Vol. 18, Issue 4,Version 1, 2018, pp. 7-
20; Vangelis Papadimitropoulos, ‘Reflections on the Contradictions of the Commons’, Review of Radical 
Political Economics, Vol. 50(2), 2018, pp. 317–331; Vangelis Papadimitropoulos, ‘The Politics of the Commons: 
Reform or Revolt?’ Triple C 15 (2), 2017, pp. 565-583. 
40 Kostakis and Bauwens, Network Society and Future Scenarios for a Collaborative Economy, p.356. 
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autonomous.  
Therefore, for the Commons to flourish, an adequate state support is 
necessary. The state can facilitate the transition to a decentralized and self-
managed economy by various means: funding, education, infrastructures, the 
legal system, and so on. I am not suggesting here that autonomous movements 
should resort to any sort of state paternalism to sustain themselves. I am not 
insinuating any contradictory claim that heteronomy has to support autonomy in 
order for the latter to abolish the former in the long run. I am rather pointing to 
the destatification or commonification of the state, as illustrated, for example, by 
Nick Dyer-Witherford and Vasilis Kostakis and Michel Bauwens respectively41. 
Individual and collective autonomy cannot depend on a central authority subject 
solely to representative democracy. Destatification devolves administrative power 
to a multiplicity of associations. The role of government is redefined to support 
collective initiatives rather than substitute for them, diffuse rather than 
concentrate control, nurture social transformation from the bottom up rather 
than engineer it from top down. The state should transform into mini-states of 
commons-based peer production ecosystems that implement direct democratic 
procedures and practices. Social freedom cannot but rely on the autonomous 
activity of individuals and collectives. The future, thus, of social freedom could 
lie on the institutional reconfiguration of the separation of powers, oriented 
towards the enhancement of individual and collective autonomy across all fiels of 
society. 
CONCLUSION 
The radical freedom of the imaginary is synonymous to the ontological novelty 
deriving from Castoriadis’s logic-ontology of Magmas and expanding accordingly 
into his epistemological and political thought. In Castoriadis’s ontology, Being is 
Chaos or Abyss, the main attributes of which are indeterminacy and creation. 
Being divides into three intertwined but differentiated strata: nature, the psyche 
and the social-historical. Nature splits in its turn into the living being (flora and 
fauna) and the non-living being (inorganic matter). The “essential” feature of the 
 
41 Nick Dyer-Witherford. ‘The Circulation of the Common.’ Paper presented at Immaterial Labour, 
Multitudes And New Social Subjects: Class Composition In Cognitive Capitalism- Immaterial Labour 
Conference – University of Cambridge, 2006; Kostakis and Bauwens, op. cit. 
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living being is the elementary imaginary. Novelty is a creation ex nihilo stemming 
from the radical imaginary, that is, the free intentional / affective / 
representational flux of the human psyche, which, as such, is not reduced to the 
causality of the ensemblistic-identitary dimension of nature, for it consists in the 
autonomization of the feeling of pleasure and the concomitant domination of 
representational pleasure over purely organic pleasure. The novel emerges anew 
on the basis of the conflict between the conscious and the unconscious or, in other 
words, the sublimation of the primitive urges of the monadic core of the psyche 
into society. But, at the same time, the novel transcends the boundaries of the 
sublimation of the psyche into society, re-establishing anew the imaginary 
significations of society. The novel traverses the free representational pleasure of 
the human psyche by evolving into the inter-general representation of the social 
imaginary of the anonymous collective through the creation ex nihilo of the 
magma of the imaginary significations of society. This constant recreation of 
society reflects in history over time. The main locus of the novel is the socio-
historical.   
For Castoriadis, the radical freedom of the imaginary bears some serious 
philosophical, epistemological and political consequences. Firstly, it breaks with 
the “determinacy principle”  ruling most part of traditional philosophy and 
modern science. Secondly, it introduces an alternative epistemological approach, 
inasmuch as it renders the living being a for itself  subject to the ontological 
premises of constant re-creation and destruction. In this vein, science is a playful 
experimentation between the known and the unknown. Science is not just the 
discovery but also the recreation of nature. Thirdly, and most importantly, it 
creates per se a novel political paradigm, demonstrated in the project of 
individual and collective autonomy, which opposes equally, yet differently, both 
Marxism and liberalism, for it consists in a radicalization of democracy through 
the establishment of positive freedom, aiming at the equal opportunity of the 
participation of people in politics. The radical freedom of the imaginary is 
indicative of the tragicalness of democracy, that is, the virtue of realizing and 
correcting its mistakes over time. Lastly, direct democracy opposes the rational 
mastery of the unlimited expansion of technology and economy in nature and in 
society, which is responsible for the ecological and economic crisis of our times. 
For Castoriadis, the ecological and democratic deliberation over the usage of 
technology and economy is sine qua non for the sustainability of nature and 
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prosperity of society. 
One of the problems, though, of Castoriadis’s political project is the rejection 
of state politics in toto, relying solely on the autonomous movements of individuals 
and collectivities. And, indeed, we are witnessing nowadays a number of 
initiatives developing on the model of platform cooperativism and the Commons, 
thus echoing Castoriadis’s project in several respects.  However, for these 
movements to flourish and multiply, the support of the State is necessary – but 
not sufficient– inasmuch as it can facilitate the transition to a decentralized and 
self-managed economy and society by various means: funding, education, 
infrastructures, law, and so on. 
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